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High labor intensive (HIMO) public works programs have been very popular in recent years in 
Madagascar. They have been one of the most common safety net programs used in Madagascar 
to address poverty and vulnerability.  The objectives of these programs are to provide income 
support to the poor after natural disasters and during seasonal agricultural employment slack 
period (soudure), and to improve much needed local infrastructures. This paper assesses the 
effectiveness of HIMO interventions in addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable households 
using the data from 15 projects implemented between 2006 and 2008 by several agencies.  The 
main finding of this study is that despite their great potential, HIMO projects have shown the 
following limitations in the Madagascar context: a) lack of coordination among projects 
implemented by different agencies; b) ineffective targeting and poor selection of projects; c) lack 
of monitoring and supervision. The paper identifies four areas for improvement: a) better 
harmonization and coordination of HIMO projects to ensure consistency of approaches among 
interventions; b) better geographical targeting and selection of projects; c) setting the wage rate 
according to the local socio-economic conditions to promote self selection of the poor; d) better 
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Executive Summary  
 
In recent years, highly labor-intensive (HLI) public works projects have gained popularity in 
Madagascar.  The objective of these programs has been to provide a source of income to the poor 
during critical periods such as those following natural disasters, to address the lack of seasonal 
employment during the season of penury [période de agricultural slack season], and to improve 
local infrastructure. 
 
Malagasy households are the victims of various climate-related, economic, health-related, and 
social shocks that place them at risk of sliding into or remaining mired in poverty.  The main 
covariant shocks are political instability, fluctuations in the prices of rice and other traditional 
products, natural disasters, and plant and animal diseases, while the primary idiosyncratic shocks 
are health crises, student dropouts, unstable employment, and insecurity (Del Ninno, Mills, and 
Rajemison 2004). 
 
Available safety net programs are unable to respond to poverty and vulnerability in Madagascar.  
A study of safety net social programs (Ravelosoa and Key, 2004) revealed a number of 
deficiencies in different programs in Madagascar, namely: 
•  Inadequate monitoring and evaluation of outcomes and effectiveness; 
•  Lack of social protection policy coordination, given the plethora of actors involved; 
•  Inadequate social protection public resources and linkage with donor funding; 
•  Dearth of mobilized funding, which reduces the sustainability of programs; 
•  Management problems and low capacity levels; 
•  Insufficient number of programs relative to the risks and vulnerabilities addressed by 
these programs; 
•  Problems associated with the targeting of intervention zones and the beneficiaries in these 
zones; and 
•  Lack of clarity with respect to the determination of wages for HLI projects, resulting in 
the exclusion of a number of targeted beneficiaries. 
 
Despite their potentially broad scope, highly labor-intensive public works projects face 
significant limitations in the Malagasy context.  These limitations include ineffective targeting, 
lax monitoring and evaluation, and a lack of coordination among HLI projects implemented by 
the different agencies. 
 
The lessons learned from developing countries around the world attest to the capacity of public 
works to help the poor cope with the covariant risks linked to climate and systemic shocks 
(Subbarao, 2003; Del Ninno, Milazzo and Subbarao, upcoming publication).  
 
The Government recently strengthened its commitment to assist poor households with the 
prevention, mitigation, and ability to cope with these shocks.  The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper, submitted by the Government in 2003, calls for a national social protection strategy that 
accords a central role to risks and vulnerabilities in order to reduce poverty and strengthen 
human capital in Madagascar.  In order to enhance the efficient execution of social protection 
policy, the Government (in conjunction with the stakeholders and technical and financial 
partners), developed a National Strategy for Risk Management and Social Protection [Stratégie  
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Nationale de Gestion des Risques et de Protection Sociale SNGRPS] in 2007. One of the 
SNGRPS priority sectors is increasing the income of vulnerable groups and identifying HLI 
projects as interventions.  This work should be harmonized and continued in order to respond to 
heightened vulnerability during pre-harvest periods and in the aftermath of natural disasters.  
 
This report is a continuation of the study conducted by Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka 
(2007).  It analyzes detailed information related to 15 HLI projects executed in the past two years 
by several agencies, with the aim of assessing their effectiveness relative to the needs and 
vulnerabilities of poor households in Madagascar.  
 
The main findings of this analysis are as follows: 
•  HLI projects are carried out by several agencies with different objectives in mind.  The 
common objective is the creation of temporary employment opportunities, with a few 
agencies (FID and WFP) focusing on emergency responses to natural disasters and other 
shocks.  The secondary objective is typically to improve access to basic infrastructure. 
•  Depending on the specific nature of the shocks affecting various regions of the island, 
HLI projects are usually implemented after the rainy season and during the season of 
penury. However, the duration of work (most often between 10 and 30 days and up to 
three months in the case of ILO projects) is often too short to have an appreciable effect 
on the income of the most vulnerable households.  During project visits, the number of 
persons seeking jobs was found to be much higher than jobs available.  As a result, a 
rotating system was used almost everywhere in order to provide employment 
opportunities to as many of the poor as possible. 
•  The work performed involves the construction and/or repair of basic infrastructure (roads, 
irrigation canals, small dams, bridges), clean up of canals and routes, and tree planting 
and reforestation. This work is generally highly labor-intensive (about 80 percent), with 
the exception of projects executed by the ILO, where the share of non-wage expenses is 
higher, with wage costs ranging from 23 percent to 42 percent of total program costs and 
a large portion of these wages being paid to more skilled workers. 
•  In most of the projects reviewed, the hourly wage for unskilled workers is higher than 
market wages, the result being that workers who are in a comfortable position compete 
for the limited number of HLI jobs in the same zones. Several targeting approaches are 
used by the different agencies in Madagascar, which are generally not effective in 
selecting the poorest zones and the most needy population groups.  The SNGRPS has 
revealed that in order to cope with shocks, the more comfortable households have a 
higher participation rate in HLI projects than the poor.  The fact that wages are so high 
can make targeting less effective by excluding the poorest from the self-selection process 
for these projects. 
•  Communities (represented by fokontany or commune) have an important role to play in 
the selection and proposal of work to be conducted.  Projects require the approval of the 
local administrative authorities (each executing agency must obtain the approval of the 
different authorities).  To be approved, projects must meet a number of criteria outlined 
by the various executing agencies (technical feasibility, availability of materials, 
minimum labor-intensive component, project eligibility, etc.). 
•  Several entities have received financing and have been involved in the design and 
execution of HLI projects in an uncoordinated manner.  
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•  Poor quality of the infrastructure built or repaired using HLI projects.  Project visits 
revealed that a number of executing agencies lack the technical capacity to supervise 
work. 
•  Absence of a system for reviewing data collected on HLI projects (breakdown of figures 
on wages, materials, and other input costs as well as household data, etc.) makes it 
impossible to assess their impact and thus identify areas requiring improvement.   
 
Based on the individual analysis of HLI projects, a number of priority improvement zones have 
been identified and grouped into four categories of strategic recommendations: 
 
9   Improved harmonization and coordination of HLI projects.  In order to be an effective 
national social policy mechanism for responding to highly vulnerable situations in 
Madagascar, HLI interventions should be harmonized through application of the same 
criteria and norms across the board.  As underscored in the SNGRPS, an effort should be 
made, in the short and medium term, to clarify and harmonize objectives and criteria (such 
as wage levels, intervention zones, and intervention triggers) with respect to current HLI 
programs.  The capacity of the Government (and its centralized units) to coordinate HLI 
project execution should be reviewed and enhanced in order to ensure that interventions 
are effective and consistent.  
 
9   Geographic targeting and choice of projects.  To boost the impact on the poor (through 
revenue transfer and, indirectly, through assets created), resources should be allocated to 
the poorest zones (which are often those most vulnerable to shocks), using a sophisticated 
poverty map.  The most vulnerable populations are found in rural zones, isolated 
communities, and communes with substandard infrastructure, where poverty rates are 
higher.  The identification of intervention zones should be followed by the identification of 
the poorest groups in these zones.  
 
The role of local communities in selecting the infrastructure to be built or repaired through 
HLI projects should be continued and strengthened, with a view to ensuring the 
sustainability of assets created.  
 
9    Payment of wages conducive to self-selection by the poor.  If HLI projects are to transfer 
revenue to the poor and most of the vulnerable population by providing temporary 
employment opportunities, the hourly wage for unskilled workers should not be higher 
than the market wage.  Given the significant differences in average income in regions, the 
setting of a uniform rate for all regions of Madagascar would be inappropriate.  The level 
of remuneration can be adjusted to suit local socioeconomic conditions but should always 
be lower than the corresponding market rate.  Specific rules and standards should be 
established with respect to the project policy harmonization process. 
 
9    Improved monitoring and collection of data to assess the impact of HLI projects. A 
system for monitoring and evaluating outcomes should be established in order to facilitate 
the systematic evaluation of programs and identify problems and areas for improvement, 
with a view to strengthening further the social protection system and laying the 
groundwork for streamlined planning.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the late 1980s, several HLI public works programs have been carried out in Madagascar.  
These HLI programs have been used primarily to mitigate the harmful effects of crises (natural 
disasters, socioeconomic crises, etc.), and thus reduce the vulnerability of poor households.  
 
The rationale for public works programs in low-income countries is based on five factors 
(Subbarao, 2003): 
•  The programs facilitate the transfer of revenue to poor households.  In countries with 
high unemployment rates, transfers can stave off the exacerbation of poverty, particularly 
during critical periods. 
•  Depending on their timing, public works programs can also permit households to cope 
with the host of consumption shortages they may face (for example, during the season of 
penury or in the wake of multiple of covariant shocks). 
•  Through well-designed “workfare programs,” the necessary infrastructure can be built or 
repaired, thereby narrowing the gap between public expenditure on revenue transfer and 
public expenditure on development. 
•  The durable goods created by these programs have the potential to generate employment 
benefits as an indirect effect while the necessary infrastructure is put in place. 
•  Programs can be targeted in specific geographic zones that have high unemployment and 
poverty rates.  Poor zones and communities can benefit directly from the program (in 
terms of the transfer of benefits), as well as indirectly (in terms of the material goods 
created or restored by the program). 
 
Malagasy households, particularly those living in rural areas, are subject to a range of shocks and 
vulnerabilities that have placed them at risk of slipping into or remaining mired in poverty.  The 
majority of the population (three-quarters of Malagasy households) engages in agricultural 
activities and is therefore dependent on seasonal employment.  Public works programs, if well-
designed and implemented, can have a considerable impact on Madagascar.  HLI interventions 
should be used to reduce the vulnerability of the poor by creating temporary employment in 
order to prevent and respond to the effects of natural disasters and socioeconomic shocks and to 
contribute to local development by expanding their access to basic infrastructure (roads, 
irrigation systems, primary schools, etc.). 
 
This document will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which HLI projects can be used to meet 
permanent and/or temporary employment needs in the wake of shocks (natural disasters, a major 
economic crisis, and other similar disasters affecting all regions and/or communes). The 
document is a follow on to the study done by Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka (2007). 
Overall information on HLI programs for 2005/2007 was collected from the main organizations 
that focus on this HLI approach, namely: 
•  Development Intervention Funds (FID) – SR/SP component; 
•  The National Nutrition Office (ONN); 
•  The Coordination Unit for Economic Recovery and Social Action Projects 
(CCPREAS); 
•  The International Labour Organization (ILO), with NORAD financing;  
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•  The World Food Program (WFP);  
•  Catholic Relief Services (CRS); and 
•  CARE International. 
 
This information should facilitate assessment of the effectiveness of HLI projects, with a view to 
reducing significantly the job shortage on the labor market. 
 
The second section reviews the main risk and vulnerability factors in Madagascar.  The third 
outlines the HLI approach and its role in the context of the SNGRPS in Madagascar. The fourth 
section presents the project data collected and analyzes conceptual frameworks (wages, timing, 
duration, labor intensity), and institutional frameworks (the various stakeholders involved in 
project funding, design, and execution).  The fifth section identifies the problems and also 
presents the scant evidence available on the effectiveness and outcomes of the projects.  The 
final section provides a number of policy recommendations. 
 
II.  Poverty and Vulnerability in Madagascar  
 
This section provides an overview of the macroeconomic context and major risks and 
vulnerabilities faced by Malagasy households, with the aim of providing an understanding of 
potential impacts and the role of HLI interventions in the SNGRPS. 
 
2.1.  The Macroeconomic Context and Poverty Trends  
 
After a long period of stagnation, the Malagasy economy has been showing gradual signs of 
improvement since 1995.  Macroeconomic developments have been closely associated with 
poverty reduction in urban zones, where the poverty rate has declined from 63 percent in 1997 to 
44 percent in 2001 (see Table 1).  As Table 1 indicates, the rural area has not benefitted from the 
gains associated with economic growth, and rural poverty rates have remained very high 
(affecting more than three-quarters of the rural population). 
 
The 2002 crisis had a very serious social and economic impact.  That year, the poverty rate stood 
at almost 81 percent, GDP fell by 12.7 percent, and the inflation rate increased by 13.5 percent.  
Poor farmers, newly unemployed persons in the formal sector, and persons living in extreme 





Table 1:  Poverty Trends, 1997-2005 
Poverty Indicators  1997  1999  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Poverty (% of the population)         
National  73 71 70 81 74 74  68.7 
Urban  63 52 44 62 52 54 52 
Rural  76 77 77 86 80 80  73.5 
Extreme Poverty (% of the population)         
  National  63 62 59 62       
  Urban  54 43 32 38       
  Rural  66 67 67 70       
Source: SNGRPS, 2007. 
 
 
After a considerable increase in the incidence of poverty in 2002 (more than 80 percent), the 
2003 economic recovery (with a GDP growth rate of 9.8 percent) reduced the poverty rate to 74 
percent. Overall, approximately 70 percent of the population is poor and roughly 60 percent 
lives in extreme poverty. Poverty is widespread in rural zones, where shocks produce a lasting 
effect on the well-being of households. Eighty percent of the poor in Madagascar live in rural 
zones and more than two-thirds of the rural population lives in extreme poverty.  The poorest 
socioeconomic groups are found in households headed by small or medium farmers. 
 
2.2.  Shock and Vulnerabilities 
 
Malagasy households face a variety of environmental, social, health, and economic shocks, 
which heighten their vulnerability to poverty and can temporarily or permanently affect their 
well-being.  The most common types of covariant shocks include (i) environmental and climatic 
shocks such as cyclones, floods, and droughts that often affect one part of the island.  These 
shocks can have a particularly significant impact on the well-being of households in rural zones 
that rely on agriculture; (ii) social and political instability, as demonstrated by the 2002 political 
crisis; (iii) macroeconomic shocks such as a decline in terms of trade, and fluctuations in 
commodity prices (rice, coffee, vanilla, clove); and (iv) loss of production and revenue owing to 
phytosanitary and epizootic diseases.  The biggest shocks affecting individuals or households are 
health-related (several serious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and cholera can 
be found in Madagascar), malnutrition (which poses the greatest risk among children under age 
3, particularly during the period of low agricultural productivity),
1  education (school failure or 
dropout makes households more vulnerable to poverty in the future), and employment instability.   
 
                                                            
1 Caloric intake declines considerably during the season of penury, particularly in the poorest households.  During 
the season of penury, when the rate of malnutrition is 15 percent higher, poor urban households reduce their caloric 
intake by 5 percent, and rural households, by 11 to 12 percent (SEECALINE, Evaluation of the Food and 
Nutritional Situation in Madagascar, 1996).  
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A study done by Del Ninno, Mills, and Rajemison (2004) identifies the characteristics of 
households that best reflect poverty and can be used as indicators of vulnerability.  Table 2 
shows the incidence of poverty based on various household groups.  Engaging in agricultural 
activity is a major indicator of vulnerability to poverty.  Twelve million persons or 73 percent of 
households engage in agriculture.  These households have a higher poverty rate (81 percent) 
compared to those households that do not engage in agricultural activity (33 percent).  Eleven 
percent of households do not have any individuals working full time, and the poverty rate in such 
households stands at 84 percent.  Households with primary school age children who do not 
attend school and those headed by illiterate adults account for approximately one-quarter of all 
households and have higher rates of poverty than those where such characteristics are absent.  
 
Table 2:  Household Vulnerability Indicators  
Poverty rate 






affected  With (%)  Without (%) 
Agricultural activity  73  77  12,013,054  81  33 
Underemployed/unemployed 11  7 1,141,111  84  69 
Child not attending school  24  32  4 ,992,713  89  61 
Adult who did not attend school  25  21  3,265,451  83  66 
Children under age 3  37  45  7,084,472  78  63 
Female head of household  16  11  1,657,430  71  70 
Disabled adult  2  2  289,655  76  70 
More than 7 persons  20  36  5,617,570  84  62 
Source: Del Ninno, Mills and Rajemison, 2004. 
 
In terms of communes, infrastructure availability is a key indicator of vulnerability.  Table 3 
shows that poverty rates are higher in communes that do not have social infrastructure than in 
schools, health centers, agricultural extension services, and transportation and communication 
infrastructure. 
Table 3:  Infrastructure in Communes and Poverty Rates  
Poverty Rate  
 





without access   With (%)  Without 
(%) 
Social and Agricultural Infrastructure 
Health center  2  283,680 70  87 
Hospital 75  11,704,322 47  78 
Lower level secondary school  23  3,542,770 65  85 
Higher level secondary school (high school)  69  10,856,601 42  85 
Agricultural extension services   58  9,035,204 60  77 
Veterinary services  55  8,589,340 57  81 
Transportation and Market Infrastructure  
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National road  40  6,251,367 61  84 
Access by truck  28  4,355,589 64  85 
Access by cart  40  6,204,364 64  78 
Access by foot  11  1,739,102 68  87 
Seasonal market  75  11,735,022 68  77 
Wholesaler 63  9,807,909 60  84 
Source: Del Ninno, Mills and Rajemison, 2004. 
 
III.  Definition of HLI Public Works and Role in the National Social 
Protection Strategy 
 
The use of the term HLI, depending on the type of document, is the subject of controversy.  
Public works programs are defined as those that provide short-term employment at low wages 
to skilled and unskilled workers to work on highly labor-intensive projects such as the 
construction of roads and the repair of irrigation infrastructure, reforestation, and soil 
conservation, and provide a minimum wage to the poor, thereby permitting the unemployed to 
join the work force (Subbarao, 2003).
2  This terminology was globally adopted by the World 
Bank’s “Safety Net” team and, in the strict sense of the term, includes work that involves 
significant labor costs and targets the rapid transfer of revenue to workers.
3  In practice, this 
definition has been expanded to include public works which, without a doubt, are highly labor-
intensive but also have other objectives, a longer duration, and other compensation methods 
(food, for example).   
 
The  HLI programs of the FID (financed by the World Bank), CCPREAS (financed by the 
Malagasy State), and the ONN (financed by the Malagasy State) fall into the category defined by 
the World Bank (duration generally not longer than one month and the proportion of wages to 
total costs ranging from 60 to 80 percent (see Table 4)).  Using the ILO definition, these projects 
fall into the very highly labor-intensive (VHLI) category.  Other HLI programs implemented by 
the ILO (with NORAD funding) provide employment for longer than two months and have a 
lower wage component (36 percent).  The HLI programs of the WFP offer food in exchange for 
work by persons who are victims of climate shocks (cyclones, droughts, etc.)  Other international 
NGOs such as CARE and CRS (funded by USAID, European Union, WFP, etc.) use a blend of 
“money-for-work” and “food-for-work” approaches.   
 
                                                            
2 “Systemic Shocks and Social Protection: Role and Effectiveness of Public Works Programs,” Kalanidhi Subbarao, 
Social Protection Unit, World Bank, January 2003. 
3 “Safety Net Programs in Madagascar: Strategic Issues and Options,” Julia Rachel Ravelosoa and Roger Key, 
Consultants, Human Development 2, Africa Region, World Bank, June 2004.  
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Table 4:  Job Creation in HLI Programs during the 2005-2006 Period 
Agencies 
Investment 










Wage bill  










(d) = (c)/(a) 
Cost per 
person/per day 
(in Ar ) 
 
 
(e) = (a) / (b) 
FID 9,475.3  4,821.3  7,580.2  80  %  1,965 
ONN 6,500.0  1,010.9  4,225.0  65  %  6,430 
CCPREAS 13,018.4  4,280.3 9,192.9 71  % 3,041 
ILO 6,725.3  1,037.9  2,450.5  36  %  6,480 
Source: FID, ILO, ONN, CCPREAS, our own calculations. 
 
 
In analyzing HLI work conducted by the main agencies, the nature of the work is the main factor 
in this typology definition exercise.  The following works can be cited: 
•  Construction and/or rehabilitation of basic infrastructure (irrigation canals, small 
hydraulic dams, roads, alleys, etc.);  
•  Clean up activities (cleaning of roads or alleys, trash pick up, cleaning of irrigation canals 
or drains, etc.); and 
•  Environmental protection (planting of trees or reforestation, securing of dunes, etc.). 
 
The other factor is the duration of work – less than one month, two to three months, and more 
than three months.  
 
At this juncture, the confluence of these two factors gives rise to a host of different types of HLI 
work in Madagascar.  However, in this study, we will make a distinction between two categories 
of HLI projects.  The first category of HLI projects involves work that does not require the use of 
construction inputs and materials, such as clean up and environmental protection work.  In this 
case, the labor component is very dominant, the work requires mainly unskilled labor, and its 
duration is short.  Except in the case of the ILO, most agencies conduct this type of HLI work.  
The second category of HLI projects involves much more extensive use of materials and tools as 
well as skilled workers.  The duration of these projects is longer.    
 
3.1.  The Impact of HLI Projects on Employment and the Economy 
 
A comparative analysis of the execution methods of infrastructure work conducted in 2006 by 
the ILO (see Table 5) shows that the use of the HLI approach generated two and a half times as 
many direct and indirect jobs as opposed to the HCI approach. However, this analysis reveals 
that the HLI approach calls for less foreign currency than the HCI approach – 50 percent versus 
71 percent for roads; 56 percent versus 76 percent for buildings; and 46 percent versus 73 
percent for irrigated zones.  Lastly, the HLI approach is much less expensive than the HCI 
approach.  It is five and a half times less expensive than the HCI approach for roads, 55 percent 
less expensive for buildings, and three times less expensive for irrigated zones.    
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Table 5: Comparison of the Execution Methods for Certain Types of Infrastructure in 2005  
Infrastructure 
Categories   Roads Buildings  Irrigated Zones   Urban 
Roads  
Execution 
Method   HLI 
Semi -
mechanized  HCI HLI 
Semi -
mechanized  HCI HLI  HCI  HLI 
Total Labor  
 




























Foreign currency  49.9%  60.8  71%  56.3% 59.1% 76.3% 46.7%  73.1% 28.4% 
Local materials   15.6%  9.8%  8.1%  33.6%  19.3% 3.4% 37.7%  2.6% 40.6% 


















Source: “Comparative study of the different approaches used for various types of basic infrastructure work in 
Madagascar,” Marc Van Imschoot, September 2006.  
 
 
Following this, the impact of HLI projects on the Malagasy economy and the different effects of 
HLI and HCI technologies on economic variables (production, consumption, employment, public 
finance, and balance of payments) were demonstrated using the MADHIMO
4 model.  By way of 
illustration, the tool facilitated identification of the salient points below in the case of an 
investment of Ar 164.4 billion (see Table 6). 
 
Consequently, the method of execution (HLI, HCI) selected for specific infrastructure work in 
fact acts as a key determinant of the number of jobs created, the amount of local materials used, 
the wage bill, the amount of foreign currency taken in or paid out, the extent of the involvement 
of micro, small, and medium enterprises, and the unit cost of the investment in question.   
 
Table 6: Comparative Analysis of the Investment Impact of Ar 164.4 billion on Infrastructure Work  




Direct Indirect  Total  Direct Indirect Total 
Total Value Added   72.74  170.94  243.68 35.84  84.24  120.08 
Consumption 60.22  191  251.22 29.68  94.12  123.8 
Household  Income  72.74 230.72 303.46 35.84 113.64 149.54 
Public Deficit  -155.34  15.64  -139.68 -152.28  7.72  -144.56 
 Public  Expenditure  -164.4  0  -164.4 -164.4  0  -164.4 
 Public  Revenue  9.08  15.64  24.72 12.12  7.72  19.8 
  Import Duties  8.42 8.94  17.36 11.8  4.4 16.2 
  Taxes on Goods and 
Services  0 4.64 4.64 0 2.28 2.28 
  Income Tax  0.66 2.06 2.72 0.32 1.02 1.34 
Balance of Trade  -91.66  -97.38  -189.04 -128.56  -47.98  -176.54 
Job Creation   54,276.4  96,813.8  151,090.2 26,745.6 47,706.8 74,452.4 
Coefficient       1.48     0.73 
Source: Macroeconomic framework and potential of approaches based on employment and local resources, Eric 
Ramilison and Jean Gabriel Randrianarison, 2007. 
                                                            
4 The MADHIMO model, a type of input-output model, simulates the macroeconomic impact of the HLI approach 
in Madagascar and was initially designed by Mireille Razafindrakoto in 1997.  
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3.2.  The Contribution of HLI Projects to National Strategies  
 
As indicated in the previous sections, poor households, which constantly weather a host of 
vulnerabilities, were hard-hit by the 2002 political crisis.  
 
A National Strategy for Risk Management and Social Protection (SNGRPS) was developed in 2007 in 
order to “better orient policies and public expenditure, with a view to reducing the 
vulnerabilities to which Malagasy households are exposed, and helping the Government reduce 
extreme poverty.”  In light of the many risks that impact the well-being of Malagasy households, 
the SNGRPS identifies priority actions in order to allocate limited resources to zones where 
needs are most pressing. These include activities in the areas of education, health, nutrition, crisis 
response, and social readjustment. 
 
The following are the key principles that underpin the SNGRPS: (a) risk-based prioritization. 
Resource capacity and execution constraints imply that in the short term, only the biggest risks 
and the most vulnerable population sectors should be targeted; (b) appropriate targeting of 
beneficiaries is essential in order to avoid very sharp increases in social protection expenditure, 
blunting of the impact, and distortion in the goods and services markets; (c) focusing attention on 
reduction and prevention; (d)  complementarity with private risk management mechanisms; (e) 
harmonization with the decentralization framework – support for social protection to include, to 
the fullest extent possible, local community initiatives; (f) inclusion of civil society actors; (g) 
autonomy and subcontracting, with programs on the ground being executed by public and private 
entities selected on a competitive basis; (h) results-based monitoring and evaluation; and (i) 
systematic capacity-building efforts, starting with local communities and  administrative 
authorities at all levels.   
 
The fourth SNGPRS priority sector focuses on increasing the income of vulnerable groups and 
identifies HLI projects as an intervention that should be continued in order to respond to 
heightened vulnerabilities during the pre- and post-harvest periods and in the aftermath of natural 
disasters.  The SNGRPS is subject to the constraint that in the short term, an effort will have to be 
made to clarify the objectives of existing HLI programs and to enhance their effectiveness.  In the 
medium term, such criteria as pay scales, intervention zones, intervention triggers, and annual 
reports should be harmonized.  A common manual of procedures used by all relevant agencies 





IV.  Analysis of HLI Projects 
 
Using the general information on the different HLI programs as well as the detailed information 
on HLI projects from the FID, ILO, and ONN, an analysis will be done in this section of the 
main features of HLI projects in Madagascar.  
 
4.1.  Objectives of HLI Work  
 
Table 7 below shows that the creation of temporary employment is the one of the chief 
objectives of HLI work, regardless of the period during which this work is done or its 
intervention zones. In fact, during the 2005-2006 period, the total number of persons/work days 
created through HLI work by four agencies, namely the ILO, FID, ONN, and CCPREAS, 
amounted to over 11.1 million (see Table 4).  The 2007 study done by the ILO facilitated 
assessment of the impact of job creation on GDP, under the HLI model (see section 3.1). 
 
The other main objective is improved access to basic infrastructure.  The impact of infrastructure 
construction and/or repair is more difficult to gauge.  Indeed, several parameters enter the picture 
when calculating the net benefits generated through use of this infrastructure created.  To date, 
no impact assessment has been prepared on this subject in Madagascar.   
 
Table 7:  Main Objectives of HLI Projects by Agency  
Agency  Main Objectives   Intervention Zones  
FID 
‐  Provide income and subsistence resources in exchange 
for work to the poorest victims of disasters and other 
shocks   
‐  Improve the living and environmental conditions of the 
people by financing HLI work  
22 regions (with 
greatest emphasis on the 
regions of Anosy, 
Androy, SAVA, 
DIANA, Analanjorofo, 
and Atsinanana ) 
ONN 
‐  Improve the quality of life of vulnerable populations, in 
particular in the area of nutrition, through job creation  
‐  Boost community productivity by creating and/or 
repairing hydroagricultural infrastructure  
‐  Mitigate the impact of disasters on production, 
harvested stocks, and nutrition through job creation  




‐  Create temporary employment through the HLI system  
‐  Carry  out complementary, paid activities in rural zones 
‐  Improve the water supply system in rural zones 
‐  Restore basic infrastructure  
‐  Reduce the problems of the victims of natural disasters  
22 regions  
ILO (HLI - 
commune 
level) 
‐  Create temporary employment  
‐  Build and/or repair dirt roads, irrigation canals, schools, 
urban roads, public toilets, and wells  
‐  Build the capacity of technicians in communes and 
neighborhood associations in economic and social 
infrastructure construction and maintenance zones  
‐  Build the capacity of operators in the Anosy region in 
the areas of design, monitoring and supervision, and 
execution of construction-related work/repair of 
economic and social infrastructure  
8 communes in the 
Anosy region 
WFP 
‐  Build the capacity of the most vulnerable communities 
to cope with disasters and meet their basic food needs  
‐  Create and manage assets for development and 
environmental protection  
Androy, Anosy, Atsimo 
Atsinanana and Atsimo 
Andrefana regions 
CARE 
-  Build capacity for autonomy  
- Create economic opportunities  
- Provide assistance in emergency situations  
- Contribute to strategic decision-making at all levels  







-  Create complementary, paid activities in rural zones  
-  Restore basic infrastructure 
-  Reduce the problems faced by natural-disaster victims  
-  Strengthen autonomous capacity  
Regions chosen based 
on the needs expressed 
during meetings of 
GRC stakeholders with 
the BNGRC  




4.2.  Duration and Timing of HLI Work  
 
The effectiveness of HLI public works programs lies, first and foremost, in their capacity to meet 
the needs of the poorest population groups by providing a source of supplementary income 
during critical periods, such as the season of penury,
5 or in the aftermath of shocks (natural 
disasters, sharp increases in inflation, etc.).  The more work programmed during the season of 
penury, the greater the impact on reducing the vulnerability of the poor.  In fact, during the 
season of penury, most rural households that engage in farming face a problem of food 
insecurity.  The southern part of Madagascar is chronically plagued by this food insecurity.
6  For 
example, in the Ambovombe district (Androy region), almost the entire population is plagued by 
this problem.
7 Depending on the region, this season of penury takes place at different points 
during the year, based on the schedules for the main crops of the different regions.  In the 
Androy region where manioc is a basic food product, the season of penury runs from October to 
April, approximately, and overall, lasts for seven months (see Table 8).  An analysis of the data 
provided in Table 9 therefore shows that the duration of work is inadequate when compared to 
the number of jobs created and the size of the very vulnerable population.  The reverse occurs in 
the Anosy region, where food insecurity is slightly lower but which has a very high inflation rate 
as a result of the establishment of the QMM mining project.  
 




In the north and north-east regions of Madagascar, which are often hit by cyclones,  the window 
for executing HLI projects generally corresponds to the post-cyclone season (from May).  The 
quality and sturdiness of the infrastructure built and/or repaired (for example, roads) is 
guaranteed, given that work takes place during the dry season in Madagascar.  
                                                            
5 The season of penury corresponds to the period during which farmers can no longer meet the food needs of their 
families with their own agricultural produce. 
6 This situation is also called “Kere.” 




Table 9:  Period and Duration of HLI Work  
Region  HLI Project  Agency  Period of Execution  Duration of 
Work 
Analamanga  Project No. 1  FID  May - June  20 days 
Project No. 2  May - August  75 days 
Project No. 3  May - July  71 days  Anosy 
Project No. 4 
ILO 
April - May   70 days 
Project No. 6  February  20 days 
Project No. 7  February  30 days 
Project No. 8  March  20 days 
Androy 
Project No. 9 
FID 
April 15  days 
SAVA  Project No. 11  FID  May  15 days 
Project No. 14  FID  May  10 days 
DIANA 
Project No. 15  ONN  April - May   25 days 
  Source: FID, ILO, ONN 
 
 
In order to optimize their impacts, the categories of projects need to be adapted in a way that 
allows for implementation during the season of penury, which generally coincides with the rainy 
season.  
 
4.3.  Wage Levels 
 
Entities under the oversight of the Office of the Prime Minster or Ministries (FID, ONN, 
CCPREAS) pay the same wages:  Ar 1,500 for unskilled labor, Ar 2,250 to Ar 2,500 for skilled 
labor, and Ar 3,000 for the worksite supervisors.  The ILO/NORAD HLI program at the 
commune level pays slightly higher rates, given that it adds a 12 percent supplement to gross 
wages, designated as “paid leave.”  Other entities such as CARE pay very different wages 
depending on intervention zones, which are well above those paid by most organizations 
involved with HLI work.  Wages paid to unskilled workers range from Ar 2,000 to Ar 5,000, 
while skilled workers receive double this amount
8 (Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka, 
2007). 
 
Wages are a key factor in assessing the degree of self-selection of the poor into HLI projects.  An 
analysis of Table 10 shows that only in the DIANA region was the daily wage of an unskilled 
worker involved with FID and ONN HLI projects lower than the market wage and the 
guaranteed minimum wage for 2007.
9 Of these projects visited in June 2007, the wages of 
unskilled workers in the SAVA and Analamanga regions were closer to market wages and in the 
                                                            
8 It should also be noted that CARE workers are required to work 8 hours per day, compared to 5 hours per day in 
most other projects. 
9 Decree No. 2007-246 of March 19, 2007.  
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other regions, they are higher than market rates.  This situation creates both advantages and 
disadvantages.  Indeed, given that this process entails the transfer of revenue to the poor, the 
higher the wages, the greater the impact, in theory, on improving their standard of living.  
However, there are a number of disadvantages to this policy: interest is not necessarily restricted 
to the poorest persons, given that the work can also attract persons who are less poor and 
accustomed to piece-work.  Furthermore, this system can create competition between HLI work 
and other work taking place at the same location. 
 
Table 10:  Comparison of Wages Paid to Unskilled workers by HLI Projects, Market Rates, and the 
SMIG by Region and Agency  
 
Daily Wage Paid 
by HLI Projects 








Minimum Daily Wage 





Comparison of Wages 
Region Agency 
SL UL SL UL  SL  UL  SL  UL 
Analamanga FID  2,500  1,500  3  ,478  1,506  a < b and > 
c  a ≈ b < c 
ILO 2,464 1,792  a < b and > 
c  a > b and < c 
Anosy 
CARE 
(d)  10,000 5  ,000 
3,431 1,027 
a > b and > 
c  a > b and > c 
Androy FID  2,500  1,500  1,421  1  ,027  a < b and > 
c  a > b and < c 
SAVA FID  2,500  1,500  3,161  1,461  a < b and > 
c  a ≈ b < c 
FID 2,500 1,500  a < b and > 
c  a < b ≈ c 
DIANA 
ONN 2,250 1,500 
3,163 1,812 
2,008 1,833 
a < b and > 
c  a < b ≈ c 
Source: FID, ILO, ONN, CARE, EPM 2005, and our own calculations. 
Note:   (a) 1 work day = 5 hours                                                                  SL= Skilled labor 
            (b) 2005 EPM Data                                                                                  UL = Unskilled labor  
            (c) Minimum wage in accordance with the decree issued in 2007 
           (d) Persons working on CARE Projects have an 8-hour work day 
 
 
4.4.  Targeting 
 
At this juncture, one question arises: have these HLI projects truly targeted the poorest and most 
vulnerable?  Despite the different criteria stipulated by the various agencies (see Table 11), we 
are unable to determine whether or not the workers targeted are poor/vulnerable, despite the fact 





Table 11:  Criteria for Targeting Workers for HLI by Agency  
Agency  Criteria for Targeting Workers 
FID  - Voluntary basis  
- Priority given to women  
CCPREAS  - Selection of workers on the basis of a list prepared by executing agencies with the 
assistance of officials in intervention communes and fokotanies  
ONN 
- Priority accorded to the parents of children who go to PNNC sites  
- Priority accorded to persons from the poorest households  
- Selection of workers based on a list prepared by fokotany chiefs (in collaboration with 
the liaison official or community agent for nutrition) 
ILO/NORA
D 
- Selection of workers based on a list prepared by fokotany officials and other 
prominent persons  
- Priority accorded to female single-parent households and large families (more than six 
persons)  
CRS  - Selection of workers based on a list prepared by the local authorities  
- Priority accorded to women who are breastfeeding or living alone 
Source: Author (in the report “Conception d'une stratégie de travaux HIMO réalisés dans le cadre de la Protection 
Sociale” [Design of a HLI work strategy executed in a social protection context] June 2007) 
 
In recruiting workers, priority is often given to women.  Gender sensitivity is justified by the fact 
that in rural zones, the poverty level is higher among female-headed households.  Also, the 2005 
EPM survey showed that unemployment is higher among women than men.  Executing agencies 
check to ensure conformity with the criteria stipulated for the selection of workers for HLI 
projects.  In our sampling of 15 projects, the participation of women in FID projects ranged from 
50 percent to 90 percent, while the participation of women in ILO projects stood at 30 percent, 
on average.    
 
4.5.  Labor Intensity  
 
Labor intensity, that is, the proportion of wages in relation to total project cost, is an important 
factor in the effectiveness of public works projects (see section 3.1 for a comparison between the 
various production methods).  Labor intensity is contingent on a number of factors, among them, 
the assets to be created, the availability of procedures that are based on technically and 
economically feasible work, wages, and the ability of the agency to budget non-wage costs 
accurately (Del Ninno, Milazzo, Subbarao, 2003). 
 
The analysis conducted at the start of the study shows the sizeable amount allocated to the wages 
of workers: between 65 percent and 80 percent of the total cost of the project for the FID, 
CCPREAS, and ONN, and a smaller proportion (close to 35 percent) for the ILO (see Table 12). 
The types of work to be done explain the percentage difference allocated to worker wages.  
Indeed, road construction work calls for much more construction material and requires 
specialized workers (masons, etc.).  Cleaning canals or environmental protection work, however,  
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calls for fewer technical skills and utilize the maximum number of unskilled workers.  For 
example, ILO Project No. 3 (see Annex 1), entails paving a road and building sanitation facilities 
requiring significant use of materials that represent more than 70 percent of the total  project 
cost.  However, for a number of FID projects, a portion of the funds generally allocated to 
worker remuneration is repurposed as construction material (pavement, cobblestones, etc.) in 
order to be able to follow the guidelines of 80 percent (wages), 12 percent (materials), and 8 
percent (management costs) stipulated by the FID.  From an accounting standpoint, stone paver 
wages are included in the prices of paving stones supplied.  
 
Table 12:  Costs per Person/per Day and per Beneficiary by Agency  
Region  HLI 















Analamanga  Project No. 
1  FID 300  6,000  9,420,000 11,774,500  80% 
Project No. 
2  123 9,200  31,715,488 139,745,088  23% 
Project No. 




70 4,239  9,804,868 23,508,568  42% 
Project No. 
6  300 6,237  9,744,541 12,180,677  80% 
Project No. 
7  633 4,626  7,778,200 9,723,320  80% 
Project No. 





141 2,113  3,294,500 4,113,950  80% 
SAVA  Project No. 
11  FID 309  4,641  7,176,500 8,970,625  80% 
Project No. 
14  FID 338  3,376  5,229,000 6,536,250  80% 
DIANA 
Project No. 
15  ONN 353  9,182  13,772,500 16,622,000  80% 
Source: FID, ILO, ONN and our own calculations. 
 
 
Although detailed information is not available, the labor intensity of projects implemented by 
CARE cannot be considered higher when compared with other projects implemented by other 
agencies.  CARE justifies the low level of labor intensity by pointing to the need to use quality 
materials in order to achieve sustainable results.  However, this explanation is at odds with the 
objective of HLI projects, namely, to transfer funds to vulnerable populations sectors (Johnson, 




4.6.  Institutional Frameworks  
 
HLI activities must be part of a national risk management and social protection strategy.  It is for 
this reason that they should be presented as a clearly defined, targeted, and regulated national 
instrument in order to guarantee the strategy’s success.  At the same time, an HLI project is, in 
many ways, an indication of decentralized development.  The beneficiaries must take ownership 
of the fruits of their labor if they are to use and maintain the product over the long term.  As a 
development project, it should also contribute to Communal Development Plans (PCDs).  
Government decentralization also calls for HLI activities that contribute to Regional 
Development Plans (PRDs) and to the plans of the Technical Deconcentrated Services (STDs).  
Given that HLI activities are generally not managed by national or regional offices, this 
assistance is based on policy coordination and good practices, which must then be codified in the 
form of legislation.    
 
Public works projects require a combination of several types of technical, managerial, and labor 
support, which is somewhat limited in public institutions in African countries (Subbarao, 2003). 
As Table 13 shows, the 15 HLI projects reviewed were implemented by several public sector 
partners, donors, and the private sector.  Several institutions, with varying capacities, are 
involved with project financing, design, and execution. 
 
The selection criteria of executing agencies vary by design agency.  Apart from the work carried 
out by state-controlled entities (that is, the design agencies themselves), executing agencies are 
proposed and/or selected by design agencies:  
•  In most instances, the FID opts for NGOs operating in the region of the intervention site.  
However, the executing agencies do not always have the requisite expertise to carry out 
infrastructure work.  Executing agencies must meet the following criteria:  
- Be legally constituted under Malagasy law for at least three years; 
- Have a permanent accounting unit and sound accounting practices; 
- Have effectively and verifiably implemented the activities listed in the application; 
and 
- Provide proof of generation of a financial surplus in the past year.  
•  The ILO HLI communal project uses an executing agency (MRL-HLI) that specializes in 
the HLI approach and possesses more than 10 years of experience. 
•  The selection criteria used by the CCPREAS for the selection of executing agencies are 
similar to those of the FID, namely:  
- Legal constitution and official recognition; 
- At least two years of experience carrying out community development operations; 
- At least two years of experience in carrying out and/or of training in HLI work; 
- At least two years of involvement in charitable activities; and 
-The ability to transfer to local communities or organizations expertise related to 




Table 13:  Financing, Implementing, and Executing Agencies  
Design Agency   Financing Agency   Executing Agency   Regions 
SOMIAFARA Association  Analamanga 
MAMI Association  Androy 
CARITAS Association  Androy 




SAF-FJKM Association  Diana 
FID (Responses to 
shocks/social protection 
component) 
World Bank  
SAF-FJKM  Association  Sava 
ILO (Communal HLI)  NORAD  MRL-HLI Association  Anosy (3 projects) 
CARE Anosy 
CARE SAVA    European Union  
N/A SAVA 
CARE 
ECHO, WFP, USAID 
Program 
CARE SAVA 




4.7.  Identification and Approval Process of HLI projects  
 
The role of grassroots communities, represented by villages, fokotanies, and communes, is key to the 
identification and choices of HLI work (see Table 14).  Almost all agencies stipulate that requests must 
come from grassroots communities, with support from executing agencies, in some instances.  For some, 
but not all agencies, HLI work to be performed must be included in the Communal Development Plan 
(PCD) in order to be eligible.     
 
Once projects have been identified, the approval of local authorities and associated administrative entities 
is required.  In the case of disaster-related work, the approval of the Natural Disaster and Risk 
Management Office [Bureau National de Gestion des Risques and Catastrophes CRGRC] is necessary. 
 
Different project selection criteria have been put in place by each agency.  However, the criteria prepared 
by the ILO Communal HLI program in the Anosy region bear noting.  In fact, all possible criteria, from 
the choices of fokotanies to project choices and prioritization, have been adopted – 14 criteria and 54 






Table 14 : Summary of the HLI Project Selection Processes by Agency 
  FID  ONN  CCPREAS  ILO (Communal HLI in the  
Anosy Region)  WFP 
Who proposes 
the projects? 
• Identification of the work to 
be included in the HLI 
project file by the fokontany 
or the commune 
• Selection of the Executing 
Agency (EA) by the 
fokontany or the commune, 
the FID Inter-Regional 
Directorate (if the fokontany 
or the commune so requests) 
– Priority accorded to the 
locally based EA 
• Preparation of the project 
file by the EA 
• Identification of the project 
by the villagers, the 
fokontany, the commune, or 
the region 
• Preparation by the initiators 
of the request for works  
• Identification of HLI work 
is done by the commune or 
faith-based organizations 
• These project initiators are 
assisted by an executing 
agency (faith-based NGOs or 
associations, or other) 
approved by the CCPREAS 
The project is initiated by the 
fokontany or the commune (8 
communes in the Anosy 
region are beneficiaries of the 
Communal HLI program) 
• The requesting 
communities, which meet as 
general assemblies or 
committees of leaders, 
composed of representatives 
from all socio-professional 
categories, which work 
together to identify the main 
problems they must face 
regularly and prioritize the 
activities for which food 
support will be required 
• The village group 
requesting the project must be 
supported by a WFP-
mandated partner (local, 
national, or international 
NGO)  
What are the 
roles of the 
projects in the 
development 
plan at the local 
level? 
• HLI work is not necessarily 
included in the Communal 
Development Plan (PCD).  
• They may be defined on the 
basis of on-site observations 
made before the preparation 
of the project file or in the 
aftermath of natural disasters  
• The commune initiating the 
project must be declared a 
“disaster area” by the 
BNGRC or the CRGRC in 
the wake of disasters 
 
The proposed project must be 
included and programmed in 
the PCD and/or the PRD 
(Regional Development Plan) 
Inclusion of projects in the 
PCD or PRD is not a 
requirement 
Inclusion of the requested 
project in the PCD is taken 
into account in the project 
selection criteria 
All activities supported by the 
WFP under the Food-for-
Work (FFW) program must 
be aligned with the 
development plans such as 
the Communal Development 
Plan (PCD), the Regional 
Development Plan (PRD), or 
the Intercommunal 




Source: FID, ILO, ONN, CCPREAS, WFP. 
Who approves 
the projects? 
• The project file prepared by 
the EA must first be validated 
by the initiators (fokontany or 
commune) 
• If the fokontany is the 
project initiator, the project 
must be approved by the local 
authority or the associated 
administrative entity: 
commune, district, region. 
Then, it will be finally 
validated by the BNGRC or 
the CRGRC, and, during 
finalization, by the FID Inter-
Regional Directorate 
• If the commune is the 
project initiator, the project 
file must first be approved by 
the district and the same 
process is followed thereafter 
• Request for approval 
submitted to the GTDR 
(Working Group on Rural 
Development), the DRDR 
(Regional Directorate for 
Rural Development), and the 
ORN (Regional Nutrition 
Office) 
• Once approval has been 
granted by these various 
entities, the project file is sent 
to the PSN Unit of the ONN 
• Approval from the BNGRC  
and the CRIC (Disaster Relief 
Committee) is required for 
urgent food interventions  
• The existence of the 
PNNC/SEECALINE site is 
one of the selection criteria 
for the intervention zone 
Financing request initiated by 
the commune or faith-based 
organizations with EA 
support is submitted to the 
CCPREAS for approval 
The project is approved by 
the Steering Committee for 
the Communal HLI project in 
accordance with criteria 
grouped into four 
interdependent stages (carried 
out on the basis of proposals 
made by the elected 
communal members of the 
OPCI):  
• Verification of the 
eligibility of the sites 
proposed by the communal 
authorities  
• Prioritization of eligible 
sites  
• Verification  of the 
eligibility of projects on the 
selected sites 
• Prioritization of eligible 
projects 
• The financing request may 
be sent directly to the WFP or 
to Agricultural Services, or 
via the advisors – facilitators 
in the identified risk zones, 
projects and NGOS operating 
in the region, or lastly, via the 
elected officials of the 
communes affected by food 
insecurity 
•The proposed project must 
be endorsed by the 
administrative authorities 
(fokontany, commune, 
district, region) of the 
intervention zone 
What are the 
criteria used to 
approve the 
projects? 
• Low-tech HLI project (80% 
for wages, 8% for 
remuneration to the Agency, 
and a maximum of 12% for 
equipment and materials)  
• Duration of works lasting 
less than four months  
• Project costing less than 
US$20,000 
• Daily wage paid to 
unskilled workers set at Ar 
1,500 for five hours of work 
• The project file must relate 
to food security 
• The requested works are 
achievable using the HLI 
approach (the type of works, 
number of beneficiaries, use 
of a minimum of materials) 
• Priority accorded to hydro-
agricultural development 
works and other projects 
having a direct impact on the 
nutritional status and food 
security of communities 
•Works proposed by the HLI 
project initiators must be 
included on the list of eligible 
works drawn up by the 
CCPREAS (see details in 
Annexes 3 and 4) 
• The project is essential for 
the commune 
• Works can be carried out 
using the HLI approach 
• Availability of workers at 
the local level 
• Availability of materials 
required for the works 
Approval based on the 
following criteria (see Annex 
2 for details) : 
• Site eligibility criteria;  
• Site prioritization criteria; 
• Project eligibility criteria; 
• Project prioritization 
• The conditionality criterion; 
• The existence of a 
technician, provision of office 
space in the communal 
offices, and the support of the 
people) before execution of 
the project 
WFP food aid is reserved for 
rural communities in areas 
that are most vulnerable to 
chronic natural disasters such 
as droughts and acridian 
invasions in the south, 
cyclones, and flooding in the 
east and southeast  
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4.8.  Technical Supervision of Works 
 
In the case of Agencies that use EAs, technical supervision of works is carried out by the EA. 
The Agencies conduct, in particular, unscheduled inspections, carried out by either their local or 
central level technical team, or by a private firm (Table 15). 
 
In the case of works carried out by state-controlled agencies, these very agencies are responsible 
for the technical monitoring of works.  These situations concern international NGOs such as 
CARE and CRS.  
 
Our previous report, which was drafted in June 2007, made mention of the fact that the quality of 
HLI work varies considerably, depending on the level of engagement and experience of the 
executing agency (EA).  It revealed that the experienced EAs that are well established in the 
intervention zone (associations that often have a social objective) make every effort to ensure the 
success of these small-scale projects.  However, there are other less experienced, poorly 
performing EAs that have no social relationship with the target population.  The awarding of HLI 
contracts to this latter category of EAs contributes to their survival.  A number of basic rules 
pertaining to simple technology were not applied to this category of intermediaries, thus 
shortening the lifespan of the works.  The effects of these projects were no longer visible after a 
few months, and the population was incapable of maintaining them. 
 
Table 15:  Technical Supervision of HLI Work by Agency 
Agency  Entity Responsible for Technical Supervision of Works 
FID 
•  The EA is responsible for on-site technical supervision of works  
•  The inspection conducted by the FID technical team is usually carried out once during 
execution of the works  
ONN 
•  Worksite supervisors and team leaders are responsible for daily technical supervision 
of the works  
•  In general, the PSN Unit’s technical team performs inspection and monitoring 
activities on a weekly basis 
CCPREAS 
•  The EA is responsible for daily technical supervision of the works 
•  The CCPREAS is responsible for technical inspection of the project; this 
responsibility may also be assigned to consulting firms 
ILO 
•  Daily on-site technical supervision is carried out by the MRL-HLI Association 
appointed as the EA 
•  Technical inspection is carried out by the ILO office located in Taolagnaro 
WFP 
The village group appoints, under the auspices of the partner ONG, a committee tasked 
with organization, monitoring of works, and food management. This committee will 
maintain an updated log to record attendance and periodic distribution to participants 
Source: FID, ILO, ONN, CCPREAS, WFP.  
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V.  Problems with HLI Projects and Proposed Solutions 
 
The assessment [and] implementation of HLI projects in Madagascar encounter design and 
implementation problems (methodological approach, quality of the assets created, etc.), as well 
as deficiencies in both the information system and the project monitoring and evaluation system. 
 
5.1.  Design and Implementation Problem 
 
We will not embark upon a discussion here of the strict or expanded definition of an “HLI public 
works” program. A definition of the HLI Social Protection (SP) program and HLI development 
is proposed in the 2007 study by Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka, while another study
10 
makes reference to the professional HLI and safety nets.  The common features of all the HLI 
programs identified in Madagascar are job creation and the rapid transfer of revenue (except in 
the case of the FFW program for this last point where food is distributed). 
 
The problems encountered pertain rather to the wages paid by a number of HLI projects. Indeed, 
self-selection by the poor is not a guarantee, given that wages paid for HLI projects are higher 
than the labor market rate.  The effectiveness of HLI projects to reduce poverty is lower if the 
beneficiaries are not the poorest or do not belong the most underprivileged groups.  The 2007 
National Strategy for Risk Management and Social Protection includes the strategies most 
frequently adopted by Malagasy households in the aftermath of a shock (see Table 16).  It bears 
noting that “there was more of a tendency for the most affluent households to declare that they 
were working on HLI projects in order to withstand the shocks, which could account for the 
higher level of competence among the wealthier and better educated households in competition 
for limited HLI jobs.” 
 
                                                            
10 “Intégration de l’emploi dans le processus de programmation, de sélection, d’exécution et de suivi des 
investissements publics” [Integration of Employment into the Programming, Selection, Execution, and Monitoring 
Process for Public Investments], M. Ratolojanahary and R. Raberinja, ILO, April 2007.  
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Table 16:  Household Response Strategies According to Poverty Level 
 Poorest  Q2  Q3  Q4  Wealthiest Total 
Worked more  47.2  43.6  43.5 40.3  34.3  40.9 
Reduced food consumption  20.2  20.7  22.3  22.8  24.4  22.4 
Did nothing  17.1  17.8  19.5  18.3  23.8  19.8 
Sold cattle  3.9  4.9  3.8  4.3  1.4  3.5 
Spent savings or investments  2.1  1.6  2.6  3.4  4.3  3.0 
Stopped consuming certain goods or using certain 
services  2.1 2.9 2.5 2.1  3.0  2.6 
Worked in public works (HLI)  1.7  1.9  1.5  3.0  2.5  2.2 
Sold harvests ahead of time  0.7  1.2  0.8  1.3  1.8  1.2 
Other family members worked  2.2  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7  1.0 
Obtained a loan from a friend  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.7 
Obtained a loan from a family member  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4 
Sold other assets  0.2  0.2  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.4 
Secured a loan from a bank or a mutual association   0.0  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.6  0.3 
Remarks: Other responses such as loans from other persons, sale of jewelry, rental of land, sale of land or houses, and the 
sale of equipment were all negligible, accounting for less than 0.1% of the responses. 
Source: INSTAT/DSM/EPM 2004. 
 
In view of the lack of data on the beneficiaries at the individual or household level, Ravelosoa 
and Key (2004) presented an impact analysis of the HLI projects implemented by the FID and 
the WFP, by comparing the spatial distribution of program expenditures per district to the 
poverty map. Although subject to limitations,
11 their analysis reveals that WFP programs 
redistribute resources to the poor and FID projects appear to focus more on the worst performing 
districts (see Table 17).  According to Ravelosoa and Key, distribution of the FID budget could 
be explained by the fact that the FID reaches communities through executing agencies that are 
not equitably distributed from a geographical standpoint. 
 
Table 17:  Impact of Emergency HLI Projects (As Responses to Natural Disasters) 
Classification of Districts Based 
on the Observed Poverty Rate  
Q1  Q2 Q3 Q4  Q5 Total 
WFP  26.9%  26.5% 24.2% 22.4%  0.0%  100.0% 
FID (Social Protection)  14.0%  14.3%  10.0%  13.1%  48.7%  100.0% 
Source: Ravelosoa and Key, 2004. Méthode: comparaison de la distribution des budgets de programme avec a carte 
de pauvreté par la zone [Method: comparison of the distribution of program budgets with the poverty map by zone]. 
 
In most cases, the length of time spent by workers on HLI projects is too short to help reduce the 
vulnerability of poor households.  During project visits, the number of persons seeking jobs was 
found to be much higher than jobs available.  As a result, a rotating system was used almost 
                                                            
11 A number of the households in the poor districts are above the poverty line and vice versa. Moreover, it is possible 




everywhere in order to provide employment opportunities to as many of the poor as possible 
(Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka, 2007).  
 
We would also like to raise the issue of the quality of infrastructure constructed and/or repaired 
through HLI projects.  Indeed, a rapid maximum transfer of revenue to the workers should not 
diminish the quality of the infrastructure provided. Implementation of HLI projects requires the 
use of local resources, namely materials, workers, EAs, and a users’ association, and 
consequently a high degree of ownership by the local community, which has an impact on the 
sustainability of the infrastructure.  Our site visit in 2007 revealed that a number of EAs lacked 
the technical capacity needed to supervise HLI projects.  The HLI approach was also used for 
large-scale projects (repair of old national roads or provincial roads in very poor condition). As 
soon as they were repaired, these roads were used by heavy-duty vehicles (higher traffic loads), 
thereby negating all the work done. 
 
5.2.  Deficiencies in the Information and Monitoring and Evaluation Systems 
 
One of the difficulties encountered during the conduct of this study was data collection.  Indeed, 
almost all the agencies were without a reliable information system capable of providing, within a 
short time period, the information required based on the needs of the studies. An effective 
information system must provide all the information on all stages of the HLI project, namely 
design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation.  A number of the agencies have 
incomplete information, and the available information is limited to general data focusing on 
financial information and technical data (kilometers of roads or dirt roads, length of irrigation 
canals, etc.).  
 
The documents of agreement between the financing agencies and the EAs do not provide the 
EAs with a table to be completed, in order to facilitate monitoring, for example, of the 
socioeconomic situation of the workers (it is therefore not known if the poorest workers were 
targeted or not).  
 
The table or form used in this study was sent to the agencies, and the majority of them were 
unable to completely fill in the information requested.  One of the reasons cited was the 
unavailability of certain types of information at the central level.  An in-depth assessment 
nonetheless revealed that the problems stemmed from the lack of a computerized information 
system. Most of the data were found in hard copy reports prepared by the regional offices.  There 
is no complete database on the actual status of HLI projects. 
 
All of the foregoing has a negative impact on the assessment of HLI projects in Madagascar.  
While an assessment could certainly be conducted by independent entities, each agency should 
have its own internal monitoring and evaluation system, which will require a well-designed 
information system.  
 
When the agencies outline the objectives and expected outcomes at the beginning of the project 
and its achievements at the end, concerns arise over the source of the data used to measure the 
indicators identified for monitoring these outcomes.  It was also noted that a number of agencies 
were monitoring only activities and not outcomes.  Indeed, the notion of “outcome” requires a 
describable or measurable change derived from a cause and effect relationship, and in other  
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[cases], a change in development conditions, which is found at the output, effect, or impact level. 
For example, measurement of the reduction in the vulnerability of HLI project workers requires 
data on their pre-and post-HLI project income.  
 
Despite the various recommendations outlined in previous studies, the establishment of an HLI 
Unit has not, to date, taken place.  As a result, there is no entity in place responsible for 
centralization of data on HLI programs in Madagascar.  As was previously mentioned, an 
analysis of HLI programs requires considerable data collection.  Despite the fact that the 
introduction of the HLI system is proposed in the MAP (Commitment 5 - Challenge 7 - Strategy 
4; and  Commitment 6 - Challenge 3 - Priority Activity 7) and the National Employment Support 
Program [Programme National de Soutien à l’Emploi] (Operational Outcomes 5.4), monitoring 
of its implementation still warrants clarification. 
 
5.3.  Recommendations 
 
Our assessments identified a number of problems or determinants that hobble efforts to enhance 
the effectiveness of HLI programs to address poverty and vulnerability in Madagascar. 
 
Our recommendations will focus on the improved harmonization and coordination of HLI 
interventions; geographic targeting and choice of HLI projects; wage level and duration of HLI 
work; and the establishment of an information system that will serve as an effective tool for the 
monitoring and evaluation system for the objectives and expected outcomes. 
 
 (i) Improved Harmonization and Coordination of HLI Projects 
 
The analysis of HLI projects provided in this article shows that various entities are involved in 
the design and execution of projects in an uncoordinated manner.  Each agency seeks to achieve 
different objectives through HLI projects and apply different criteria for the determination of the 
wages for the programs on one hand, and the selection of workers, project intervention sites, and 
executing agencies on the other. 
 
In order to become an effective national social policy mechanism for responding to highly 
vulnerable situations in Madagascar, HLI interventions should be harmonized through 
application of the same criteria and standards across the board.  As underscored in the 2007 
SNGRPS, an effort should be made, in the short- and medium-term, to clarify and harmonize the 
objectives and criteria (such as wage levels, intervention zones, intervention triggers, and annual 
reports) with respect to current HLI programs.  A common manual of procedures used by all 
relevant agencies would be the logical complement to a clear HLI national policy.  
 
Moreover, it is important to develop common criteria and standards for the selection of executing 
agencies (when there is a need to subcontract execution works), by ensuring that there is 
sufficient technical capacity to perform and supervise works for high-quality infrastructure 
construction.  The managerial and technical capacities of inexperienced EAs should be 
strengthened through simple short-term training programs with, where applicable, on-site 
training.  Indeed, it is essential for EAs to become more professional over time in this area, in  
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view of the fact that natural disasters are a permanent feature in several coastal areas and in the 
south.  A core group of effective EAs would be an asset to the country. 
 
The capacity of the Government and its decentralized units to coordinate HLI project execution 
should be reviewed and enhanced in order to ensure that interventions are effective and 
consistent.  
 
(ii) Geographic Targeting and Choice of HLI Projects 
 
Better targeting of the poor calls for refinement of the poverty map during the identification phase 
of the intervention zones.  The selection of intervention sites already poses a number of problems, 
owing to the lack of a preliminary study on the poverty and vulnerability situation in intervention 
zones.  The poor are generally the most vulnerable members of society, because they are often 
more exposed than the rest of the population to all types of risk, and are the least able to use the 
appropriate risk management tools.  It is virtually impossible to minimize the risks they face 
through preventive measures, as these measures are not within the reach of the individual, the 
household, or, in many cases, the community.  Informal risk management systems that can be used 
by an individual are effective only in the case of a less serious problem faced by a specific 
household; they tend to lose all usefulness when the entire community is overwhelmed by a shock.  
The poor, therefore, have no choice but to adjust their behavior to the situation, and it is under 
these conditions that there are cases of children being withdrawn from school, and the “selling off” 
of assets in addition to the actual reduction in food consumption, all of which jeopardize their 
future earning capacity and plunge them deeper into poverty, and even extreme poverty. 
 
Table 18 provides a picture of the geographical location of the most vulnerable populations, 
which should guide the selection of the zones where public works should be undertaken.  As was 
previously mentioned, the most vulnerable populations are found in isolated areas with 
substandard infrastructure, and typically in rural areas. 
 
Table 18:  Overview of Priority Vulnerable Populations – Geographical Criteria 
Geographical Vulnerability Indicators  Number of People 
Affected  Poverty Rate 
Rural Areas   13,321,000  77% 
Communes with Low Infrastructure  3,979,000  88% 
Red Zones   2,096,492  73% 
Remote Communities (access only by foot)  1,739,102  87% 
High Poverty Regions:  
  Fianarantsoa 







Victims of Climate Shocks (1999-2001)  13,784,455  73% 
(1)  The rural area of Antananarivo should be excluded from this due to lower poverty rates.  
Source: “Gestion des risques nationale et stratégie sociale de protection” [National Strategy for Risk 




A key objective is to focus on “appropriate targeting of the beneficiaries to avoid very sharp 
increases in expenses and distortion in the goods and services markets.”
12  The validation 
workshop on strategic options for social protection considered at least seven
13 variables that go 
beyond the concern of promoting the allocation of infrastructure for the communities, and 
guarantee the effective coverage of vulnerable groups and social risk management. These 
variables are as follows:  
-  Identify the types of risks that could undermine the standard of living; 
-  Determine the appropriate type of intervention that is commensurate with the scope of the 
risk; 
-  Identify the intervention zone and the geographical area; 
-  Identify the target group, that is, the group vulnerable to the shocks demarcated by the 
intervention zone; 
-  Identify the beneficiaries, that is, all persons benefiting from the social protection in 
question; 
-  Calculate the rate of coverage: beneficiary/target group percentage ratio; and 
-  Calculate the unit cost for social protection that can be broken down into intervention 
cost, administrative cost, and transportation cost.  
 
In light of this consensus and the circumstances observed at the projects visited, it seemed more 
appropriate to ensure consistency with respect to the implementation period for HLI projects, the 
intervention zone, the very vulnerable persons in question, the type of project to be implemented, 
and the sudden expansion of the related budget, in order to ensure better targeting. All these 
variables are therefore correlated for increased effectiveness. 
 










P e r i o d             





          
Gender 
Participation             
                                                            
12 Source: Summary of the works at the validation workshop on strategic options for social protection, 
Antananarivo, May 10 and 11, 2005.  Presentation made by Ms. Brigitte Lalasoa Randrianasolo, Director 
General for Population and Social Protection and President of the technical social protection group, during the 
closing of the workshop. 
13 “Safety Net Programs in Madagascar: Strategic Issues and Options,” Julia Rachel Ravelosoa and Roger Key, 
Consultants, Human Development 2, Africa Region, World Bank, June 2004.  
30 
 
Types of HLI 
Activities             
Budgetary 
Consideration            
 
 
The development of this table is based on the very notion of social protection. According to the 
SGRPS, social protection includes all government interventions that seek to provide assistance to 
the poorest and most vulnerable in the society, and help individuals, households, and 
communities to better manage risks pertaining to loss of income or capital. It seeks to: 
•  Reduce the vulnerability of low-income families with respect to their consumption and 
access to basic services; 
•  Mitigate the considerable income fluctuations for families during their lifetime; and 
•  Ensure greater equality in the population with respect to the risk of shocks and their 
impact. 
 
Moreover, selection methods for intervention sites and projects proposed by the ILO in its 
Communal HLI Program (see Annex 2 for details) could be used and introduced on a wide scale.  
Indeed, the poverty map for the  Anosy region was drawn at the start of the Communal Program 
in order to target the intervention sites and the projects to be executed.  The rating scales will 
therefore be tailored to local contexts. 
 
The role of local communities in the selection and construction of infrastructure required by HLI 
projects is critical for the sustainability of assets created.  Community involvement in the 
selection of projects to be undertaken has manifold advantages.  First, such participation will 
result in the establishment of infrastructure for which the community has the greatest need. 
Second, it creates ownership by the community of the assets created, which could lead to site 
supervision during execution of the project and subsequently to improved maintenance (Del 
Ninno, Milazzo, and Subbarao, upcoming publication). 
 
(iii) Wage Level and Duration of HLI Work  
 
International literature on the design of public works programs affirms that hourly wages must be 
higher than market wages for unskilled manual labor in agriculture or the informal sector during 
a normal year in which the program is launched (Ravallion, 1999).  One problem raised was the 
creation of a dysfunction in the labor market with the introduction of competition between HLI 
jobs and another segment of this labor market. The wage level can be adjusted to suit local 
socioeconomic conditions, but should always be lower than the corresponding market segment. 
 
Establishing a uniform rate for HLI work in all regions in Madagascar is not appropriate if the 
primary objective is self-selection of the poor. Indeed, the wages paid for HLI projects in the 
SAVA region (the “rich” region) should not be the same as that used in the Androy region (the 
“poor” region), and the study conducted based on the 2005 EPM survey shows this difference in 




The EPM data already provide a snapshot of the labor market in the region; however, 
improvements to the study on the local wage market (commune or fokontany) are recommended 
in accordance with the financial resources available to the commune. 
 
Table 20:  Average Annual Wages by Socioprofessional Category  










Analamanga  4,509,034      1,468,893  636,123 
Vakinankaratra 2,077,201  1,082,520  337,327 
Itasy 1,610,404  1,028,891  327,605 
Bongolava  1,395,287     928,392  359,220 
Mahatsiatra ambony  2,080,576  1,139,583  604,777 
Amoron'i Mania  1,442,783     975,067  309,831 
Vatovavy Fitovinany  1,482,679  1,184,273  326,536 
Ihorombe 2,447,296  1,283,368  594,899 
Atsimo Atsinanana  1,730,467     944,488  322,561 
Atsinanana 2,680,670  1,086,169  509,073 
Analanjirofo  1,419,604     741,876  190,320 
Alaotra Mangoro  1,604,373  1,177,127  491,988 
Boeny 2,229,835  1,392,548  657,498 
Sofia 1,  809,250  1,093,094  501,928 
Betsiboka 2,880,532  1,040,605  459,077 
Melaky 2,112,082  1,533,139  473,699 
Atsimo Andrefana  1,973,286     998,185  364,989 
Androy  1,748,638     722,731  600,294 
Anosy 3,346,686  1,449,179  433,823 
Menabe 3,396,698  1,303,937  478,052 
DIANA 1,516,032  1,335,789  765,360 
SAVA 2,723,052  1,335,155 617,134 
  Source: Results of the 2005 EPM, INSTAT 
 
. 
(iv) Improved Monitoring and Collection of Data to Assess the Impact of HLI Projects  
 
As already indicated, the absence of a system for reviewing detailed information collected on 
HLI projects (breakdown of figures on wages, materials, and other input costs; household data, 
etc.) makes it impossible to analyze and assess the impact of these interventions. 
 
A system for monitoring and evaluating outcomes should be established in order to facilitate the 
systematic evaluation of programs and identify problems and areas for improvement, with a view 




Recommendations outlined herein include the collection of data on HLI project workers; data on 
the impact of HLI projects; and alignment with the National Statistics Development Strategy 
(SNDS) and the MAP National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (SNISE). 
 
9  Data on HLI Project Workers 
 
Johnson, Van Imschoot, and Andrianjaka (2007) proposed the use of a standard survey form to 
measure the impact of a cash infusion on the vulnerability of workers and their households.  This 
form could therefore include the following information: 
‐  Sociodemographic information on the worker and members of his or her household; 
‐  The income earned by, and number of work days for, a worker at the job held prior to 
participation in the HLI project (with a view to measuring opportunity cost); and 
‐  Income earned for work subsequent to the HLI project (by drawing a comparison 
between his or her household consumption level and the real transfer received through 
the HLI project). 
 
9  Data on the Impact of HLI Projects 
 
The introduction of performance indicators is necessary to assess the various aspects of a 
project/program, namely inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes, and impact.
14 Thus, the 
development of a logical framework or a clear monitoring and evaluation framework is essential, 
and should also define the performance indicators. 
 
9  Alignment with the National Statistics Development Strategy (SNDS) and the MAP National 
Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (SNISE)  
 
The SNDS, which was validated in December 2007, is a framework for the alignment and 
development of national statistical activities in Madagascar and seeks to transform the National 
Statistics System (SSN)
15 into a coherent and coordinated group.  HLI program actors should 
belong to the SSN in order to benefit from the harmonization provided for in the SNDS, as well 
as from an integrated database (through the SSN portal).  Moreover, the SNISE, which is 
currently being finalized, will facilitate monitoring of the implementation of the MAP through 
the various outcome indicators of the information system (or network) for their calculation.  The 




14  “Monitoring and Evaluation: Tools, Methods, and Approaches,” World Bank, 2004.  
15 The SSN refers to all the stakeholders who contribute to the collection, processing, analysis, publication, 
dissemination, and use of statistical information (supplier, producer, and user of statistical information).  
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‐     Consolidation of  administrative data  
‐     Production of data from surveys and the RGPH   
‐     Calculation of indicators  
‐     Refinement of indicators  
‐     Setting of statistical norms and standards  
‐     Technical support to data producers  
‐     Submission of consolidated data to the MECI  
Responsibilities:    





‐     Submission of consolidated administrative data to INSTAT      
Responsibilities:    
‐     Validation of MAP monitoring and evaluation reports  
  
Members:   










‐     Drafting of mid‐term and final evaluations of the MAP  




































‐    INSTAT : National Statistical Institute   
‐    MECI     : Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry  
‐    RGPH     : General Population and Habitat Census  
‐    SNDS     : National Statistics Development Strategy  
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Annex 1:  List of Projects Visited in 2007 
 
Project 
N°  Title of the HLI Project  Design 
Agency 
Source of 
Financing  Location 
1  Repair of bund and cleaning of canal in north 
Ankazomanga   FID IDA  Analamanga 
2  Paving and repair of 730 ml of roads (Belamonty - 
Antaninarenina)  ILO NORAD Anosy 
3  Paving works for an alley  ILO  NORAD  Anosy 
4  Repair works for 260 ml of road with elimination of a 
critical point  ILO NORAD Anosy 
5  Rehabilitation of the irrigated zone in Vohitsivala  CARE 
International 
European 
Union  Anosy 
6  Maintenance works on the north Erakoka Zanavo road  FID  IDA  Androy 
7  Maintenance works on roads in Ambovombe  FID  IDA  Androy 
8  Maintenance works on the Tananysoa – Tsiteno road  FID  IDA  Androy 
9  Clearing of the road linking Ambohitsivalana to 
Ambohimalaza  FID IDA SAVA 
10  Repair of the north Ankiakabe road in Ambodimanga  CARE 
International 
European 
Union   SAVA 
11  Clearing of a road linking the Farahalana – 
Antsiharborara fokontanies  FID IDA SAVA 





Union   SAVA 
13  Indlala Emergency Program  CARE 
International 
ECHO Fund, 
WFP, USAID  SAVA 
14  Dredging of the Antsahabe stream and cleaning of the 
mud pit along the Ambanja – Benavony road  FID IDA DIANA 
15  Repair of an irrigation canal, Mantaly  ONN  Malagasy 





Annex 2:  ILO Eligibility and Prioritization Criteria for Communal HLI Sites 
and Projects  
 
1- Site Eligibility and Prioritization 
 
1.1.  Site Eligibility 
 
The key objective is to identify, along with the mayors, the poor fokontanies in the communes and to 
measure on site, using established criteria, poverty intensity in these selected fokontanies, as well as 
the level of commitment and support from communal authorities for the HLI program.  The most 
important aspect is the selection of the fokontanies by the communal authorities who are 
knowledgeable about the socioeconomic situation in these administrative entities.  An on-site 
verification based on the following indicators must then be conducted: 
-  Number of persons with no fixed employment, in relation to the working population in the 
fokontany; 
-  Daily wage rate in the fokontany; 
-  Percentage of single-parent households;  
-  Percentage of children not attending school; 
-  Accessibility; 
-  Access to drinking water; and  
-  Precarious nature of housing (flood prone, unhealthy areas, liable to be evicted). 
 
1.2. Site Prioritization 
 
The prioritization form lists five criteria, with twenty-one indicators, and two conditionality criteria: 
-  Scope and depth of poverty; 
-  Commitment of the population (participation in works); 
-  Capacity to assume responsibility for management of the infrastructure;  
-  Existence of intermediary associations; and 
-  Existence of several HLI subprojects. 
 
Each indicator receives a score out of three points based on the data collected on site:  one point was 
awarded for the least favorable situation; two points for an average situation; and three points for the 
most favorable situation.  However, in the case of sites where infrastructure or repair work was carried 
out under the previous communal HLI project, non-compliance with the maintenance clauses was 
considered: the score ranged from one to six (see No. 19 in the table below).  With respect to that 





The detailed rating system is as follows: 
 
•  (i)  “ Scope and Depth of Poverty” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(1) Children benefiting from the 
nutrition recuperation program 
Number of beneficiary children/ Number 
of children in the fokontany (%) 
< 22%                   1 pt 
= 22 %                 2 pts 
> 22%                  3 pts 
(2) Number of single-parent families  Number of single-parent families/Total 
number of families 
< 24%                   1 pt 
              24%–26%            2 
pts 
> 26 %                  3 pts 
(3) Number of unemployed persons  Number of unemployed persons 
/Population of the Fokontany (%) 
< 18%                   1 pt 
18%– 20%         2 pts 
> 20%                   3 pts 
(4) Daily wages (excluding 
development projects) 
Daily wages  > Ar 1500        1 pt 
= Ar 1500        2 pts 
< Ar 1500        3 pts 
(5) Number of youth dropouts  Number of youth dropouts/Number of 
school age youths (%) 
< 54%                  1 pt 
54%– 56%        2 pts 
> 56%                  3 pts 
(6) Level of security  Three levels  Normal                 1 pt 
Average                 2 pts 
 Low               3 pts 
(7) Accessibility  Degree of isolation  High                       1pt 
Average                   2pts 
Low                    3pts 
(8) Number of basic primary schools 
[Ecole Fondamentale du Premier 
Cycle EFPC] and private schools 
Number of schools in the fokontany  > One                         1 pt 
One school                    2pts 
None                      3 pts 
(9) Number of basic health centers 
(CSBs) and private hospitals 
Number of health centers in the fokontany  > One                     1 pt 
One  center            2 pts 
None                  3 pts 
(10) Number of standpipes or wells  Number of standpipes or wells in the 
Fokontany 
> One                    1 pt 
One standpipe            2 pts 
None                3 pts 
 
(11) Number of private latrines  Household facilities in the fokontany 
(%) 
> 6%                    1 pt 
< =6%                     2 pts 
6%                    3 pts 
(12) Housing in precarious areas 
(flood-prone, unhealthy, liable to be 
evicted) 
Direct percentage estimated by the 
researcher 
< 30 %                1 pt 
30%– 60%       2 pts 
> 60%                 3 pts 
Overall Score  12– 36 pts 
 
• (ii)  “ Commitment by the Poor to the Construction of  HLI Infrastructure”  Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(13) Commitment by the 
population to work for the 
construction of infrastructure 
Direct on-site survey  No                       1 pt 
Yes                      3 pts 





• (iii) “Capacity to Assume Responsibility for the Management and Maintenance of Community 
Infrastructure” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(14) Number of communal 
technicians 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
No technician    1 pt 
1 technician             2 pts 
+1 technician          3 pts 
(15) Number of employees 
responsible for maintenance 
(irrespective of specialty) 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
Number of employees 
No employees             1 pt 
Temporary employee(s)  2 pts 
Permanent employee(s)  3 pts 
(16) Infrastructure maintenance 
budget 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Maintenance budget per resident 
< Ar 300                 1 pt 
= Ar 300                2 pts 
  > Ar 300                  3 pts 
(17) Contribution to investment 
in recent or ongoing projects 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
Direct on-site survey 
No                          1 pt 
 
Yes                           3 pts 
(18) Self-financing of basic 
infrastructure 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey 
No                          1 pt 
 
Yes                           3 pts 
(19) Contribution to the 
maintenance of infrastructure in 
the fokontany 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey  
No                          1 pt 
Limited                     3pts 
Yes                          6 pts 
Overall Score  6– 21 pts 
 
•  (iv)  “Existence of Structured Associations Capable of Assuming Responsibility for the Project” 
Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(20) Associations or committees 
to ensure sustainability of project 
activities 
Direct on-site survey  No                        1 pt 
Yes                       3 pts 
 
Overall Score  1– 3 pts 
 
•  (v)  “Coexistence of Several HLI Projects” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(21) Coexistence and integration 
of projects proposed by the 
mayor 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey  
No                        1 pt 
 Yes                       3 pts 
Overall Score  1– 3 pts 
Overall Total – Site Prioritization   20– 66 pts 
 
•  Project Conditionality Criteria: A firm commitment from the communes is required; they will 
therefore be verified once the “Project Sites” list has been prepared.  These criteria are as follows: 
-  Assignment of a communal technician (or a skilled person); and 
-  Provision of office space in the communal offices. 
 
The conditionalities for educational institutions are: 
-  Compliance of the location with the MENRS education policy;  
-  Ownership of the land where the school is constructed;  
-  Accessibility to the school;  
-  Safety of the location of the new buildings; 
-  Available surface area; 
-  Commitment by the beneficiaries to the execution of construction support works;  
-  Commitment by the beneficiaries to the establishment of a maintenance committee within 
FRAM; and  




2.  Project Eligibility and Prioritization 
2.1.  Project Eligibility 
The project must be located in a selected fokontany, and HLI feasibility must be assessed—in other 
words, the possible execution of works using the HLI approach and its coherence with the PCD or 
the City Plan.  A project is deemed eligible if the three responses to the questions are in the 
affirmative (location, HLI feasibility, and coherence with development plans or with 
complementary projects).  
 
Remarks: 
•  A project is considered feasible in accordance with the HLI approach if the labor component is 
significant or if the “labor and materials” components are significant.  Projects that require 
transportation, spraying, and compacting equipment will, a priori, be ruled out, except where the 
commune assumes responsibility for transportation. 
•  An ineligible project can rule out a selected fokontany, if it is the sole project identified in this 
fokontany. 
  
2.2.  Prioritization of Projects 
The prioritization form lists four criteria with twelve indicators, to which conditionality criteria are 
added. 
 
The first two criteria seek to gauge the level of commitment of the commune (or the fokontany), as 
well as its contribution to communal development.  
 
The socioeconomic criterion measures the expected impact of the project on the beneficiary 
population. 
 
The technico-economic criterion verifies compliance of the project’s objectives with respect to the 
creation of temporary jobs, the cost of the project, and responsibility for maintenance.  
Once the project sites list has been prioritized, the conditionality criterion seeks to verify public 
support in the beneficiary fokontany.  This criterion will be verified at the same time as the project’s 
conditionality criteria, following approval of the project sites list by the Steering Committee and 
before the launch of the technical studies. 
 
These three criteria (presence of a technician, provision of office space in the communal offices, 
and the support of the population) must be met before the project is executed. 
 
The rating system is as follows: 
 
•   (i) “Institutional and Development” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(1)) Integration into the PCD or 
the City Plan or Network 
Coherence 
Existence of a Communal Development Plan 
and inclusion of the project in this PCD 
No                       1 pt 
Yes                      3 pts 
 
(2) Inclusion in a group of 
projects 
Two levels  No                       1 pt 
Yes                      3 pts 




•  (ii)  “Participation” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(3) Participation of the commune or 
fokontany in the construction of 
infrastructure 
Responsibility for one or several of the 
project’s components, with the exception 
of labor (materials, etc.) 
No                       1 pt  
Yes                        3 pts 
Overall Score   1 – 3 pts 
 
Remarks: P articipation will be confirmed during the on-site mission that will be conducted following 
approval by the Steering Committee; this mission will also verify compliance with the 
conditionality criteria (given that transportation is an essential component, it is not 
included as an indicator measure; this point will also be verified during the on-site 
mission). 
 
•  (iii) “Socioeconomic ” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(4) Creation of temporary jobs  Number of work days for 
execution of the works 
(Estimate) 
< 1500 work days               2pt 
1500–3500 work days      3 pts 
3500– 9500 work days    4 pts 
> 9500 work days              5  
pts 
(5) Creation of permanent jobs  Number of permanent* jobs 
created  for infrastructure 
maintenance (Estimate) 
< 0.5 jobs           1 pt 
0.5–1.5 jobs       2 pts 
> 1.5 jobs            3 pts 
(6) Income distributed to each beneficiary   Wage bill/number of 
beneficiaries 
<Ar 1,100               1 pts 
Ar 1,100–3,600     2 pts 
Ar 3,600–11,200    3 pts 
> Ar 11,200         4 pts 
(7) Improved health /hygiene conditions  Three levels 
(Estimate) 
Low                     1 pt 
Average                    2 pts 
High                        3 pts 
(8) Improved transportation 
(shorter travel times, ease of access) 
Three levels 
(Estimate) 
Low                     1 pt 
Average                    2 pts 
High                        3 pts 




The results for indicators 4 and 6 (creation of temporary jobs and income distributed to each beneficiary) 
were grouped into four categories and ranked in ascending order: the first category includes projects with 
the lowest job creation potential and is awarded two points; the second category is allotted three points; the 
third is awarded four points; and the fourth group is allotted five points.  Similarly, the first category, which 
pertains to the lowest per beneficiary income, receives one point, and so forth.  
 
*The creation of permanents jobs, which refers solely to routine infrastructure maintenance, is based on the 
following annual productivity levels: 
 
-  Road/Alley/Causeway    : 1 road maintenance worker for 2 km 
-  Canal, lake       : 1 worker for 600 ml 
-  Playing  field, market         : 0.5 workers per field 
-  Latrines                           : 1 worker  per unit 




An on-the-ground assessment of the beneficiaries’ standard of living was conducted during visits to the 
communes. 
 
•  (iv) “Techico-Economic” Criterion  
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(9)  Labor Coefficient  Labor/(Materials + tools + transportation) 
(%) 
> 46%              5 pts 
36%– 46%           4 pts 
20%–36%           3 pts 
< 20 %                       1 pt 
(10) Cost of the Project   Total cost of project /beneficiary  > Ar 32,500      1 pt 
Ar 10,500–32,500    2 pts 
Ar 4,500–10,500  3pts 
< Ar 4.500                4pts   
(11) Miscellaneous Costs  Miscellaneous costs/Total cost of 
infrastructure 
(%) 
5%                        1 pt 
2.25%–5%             2 pts 
1.8%–2.25%          3 pts 
< 1.8%                     4 pts 
(12) Ease of maintenance  Technical complexity of maintenance; need 
for specialized worker or common laborer; 
need to purchase materials 
         Easy                       3 pts 
Average                     2 pts 
       Difficult                     1pt 
Overall Score  4–16 pts 
Overall Total – Project  12–43 pts 
Overall Total – Project Sites  32–109 pts 
 
 
The results are diffuse for indicators 10 and 11 (cost of the project and miscellaneous costs).  As a result, the 
rating process groups the results into four categories and ranks them in descending order: the first category, 
which includes the most expensive per beneficiary projects, receives one point; the second category is 
awarded two points; the third is allotted three points; and the fourth is awarded is four points.  Similarly, the 
first category, which includes the highest miscellaneous costs, receives one point.  
 
*Miscellaneous costs include the rental of the compactor and the transportation of materials and tools 
covered by the project; they do not include the transportation of road materials, which is covered by the 
participating communes. 
 
Conditionalities for execution of the project.  The commune in question will be responsible for: 
-  The provision and transportation of the selected materials, sods, and potentially for water needed for 
construction of the infrastructure; and 
-  The negotiation and facilitation of access to supply sites and deposit sites for waste or non-reusable 
items. 
 





•   (i)  “ Scope and Depth of Poverty” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(1) Children benefiting from the 
nutrition recuperation program 
Number of beneficiary children/ Number 
of children in the fokontany (%) 
< 22%                   1 pt 
= 22 %                 2 pts 
> 22%                  3 pts 
(2) Number of single-parent families  Number of single-parent families/Total 
number of families 
< 24%                   1 pt 
              24%–26%            2 
pts 
> 26 %                  3 pts 
(3) Number of unemployed persons  Number of unemployed persons 
/Population of the fokontany (%) 
< 18%                   1 pt 
18%– 20%         2 pts 
> 20%                   3 pts 
(4) Daily wages (excluding 
development projects) 
Daily wages  > Ar 1,500        1 pt 
= Ar 1,500        2 pts 
< Ar 1,500        3 pts 
(5) Number of youth dropouts  Number of youth dropouts/Number of 
school age youths (%) 
< 54%                  1 pt 
54%– 56%        2 pts 
> 56%                  3 pts 
(6) Level of security  Three levels  Normal                 1 pt 
Average                 2 pts 
 Poor               3 pts 
(7) Accessibility  Degree of isolation  High                       1pt 
Average                   2pts 
Low                    3pts 
(8) Number of basic primary schools 
[Ecole Fondamentale du Premier 
Cycle EFPC] and private schools 
Number of schools in the fokontany  > One                         1 pt 
One school                    2pts 
None                      3 pts 
(9) Number of basic health centers 
(CSBs) and private hospitals 
Number of health centers in the fokontany  > One                     1 pt 
One  center            2 pts 
None                  3 pts 
(10) Number of standpipes or wells  Number of standpipes or wells in the 
fokontany 
> One                    1 pt 
One standpipe            2 pts 
None                3 pts 
 
(11) Number of private latrines  Household facilities in the fokontany 
(%) 
> 6%                    1 pt 
< =6%                     2 pts 
6%                    3 pts 
(12) Housing in precarious zone 
(flood-prone, unhealthy, liable to be 
evicted) 
Direct percentage estimated by the 
researcher 
< 30 %                1 pt 
30%– 60%       2 pts 
> 60%                 3 pts 
Overall Score  12– 36 pts 
 
 
• (ii)  “ Commitment by the Poor to the Construction of  HLI Infrastructure”  Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure  Rating 
(13) Commitment by the 
population to work for the 
construction of infrastructure 
Direct on-site survey  No                       1 pt 
Yes                      3 pts 





• (iii) “Capacity to Assume Responsibility for the Management and Maintenance of Community 
Infrastructure” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(14) Number of communal 
technicians 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
No technician    1 pt 
1 technician             2 pts 
+1 technician          3 pts 
(15) Number of employees 
responsible for maintenance 
(irrespective of specialty) 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
Number of employees 
No employees             1 pt 
Temporary employee(s)  2 pts 
Permanent employee(s)  3 pts 
(16) Infrastructure maintenance 
budget 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Maintenance budget per resident 
< Ar 300                 1 pt 
= Ar 300                2 pts 
  > Ar 300                  3 pts 
(17) Contribution to investment 
in recent or ongoing projects 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany 
Direct on-site survey 
No                          1 pt 
 
Yes                           3 pts 
(18) Self-financing of basic 
infrastructure 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey 
No                          1 pt 
 
Yes                           3 pts 
(19) Contribution to the 
maintenance of infrastructure in 
the fokontany 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey  
No                          1 pt 
Limited                     3pts 
Yes                          6 pts 
Overall Score  6– 18 pts 
 
•  (iv)  “Existence of Structured Associations Capable of Assuming Responsibility for the Project” 
Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(20) Associations or committees 
to ensure sustainability of project 
activities 
Direct on-site survey  No                        1 pt 
Yes                       3 pts 
 
Overall Score  1– 3 pts 
 
•  (v)  “Coexistence of Several HLI Projects” Criterion 
Indicator Indicator  Measure Rating 
(21) Coexistence and integration 
of projects proposed by the 
mayor 
Communal indicator to be applied to each 
fokontany  
Direct on-site survey  
No                        1 pt 
 Yes                       3 pts 
Overall Score  1– 3 pts 
Overall Total – Site Prioritization   21– 63 pts  
47 
 
Annex 3:  CCPREAS Eligibility Criteria for HLI Projects 
 
ACTIONS/PROJE
CTS  TYPES OF ELIGIBLE PROJECTS  VALUE SCALES 
Infrastructure 
(i) Access Infrastructure 
•  Opening of roads 
•  Repair of dirt roads or paved alleys 
•  Construction of pedestrian paths 
•  Construction of temporary pedestrian 
bridges 
•  Construction of stairways 
•  Repair of railways 
•  … 
 
(ii)  Social Infrastructure 
•  Construction of standpipes and public 
wash basins 
•  Construction of garbage bins 
•  Construction of public latrines 
•  Canal construction and cleaning 
works 
•  … 
(iii) Productive Infrastructure 
- Cost: ≤ Ar 20 million 
 
- HLI projects: 70% of the total cost (minimum) 
-  
- Local Labor: 60% of labor (minimum) 
 
- Local Materials: 50% of materials used 
(minimum) 
 
- Number per site: 3 (maximum) 
 
- Dimension: Modest size not requiring the use 
of heavy materials (in accordance with the 
opinion of the relevant technicians) 
 
- Duration of works: ≤ 3 months 
 
- Nature of the works: construction, expansion, 




Building used as a training room, 
community center, cultural center, 
agricultural school  
-  Requirement: needs identified by faith-based 
organizations 
 
-  Cost: ≤ Ar 100 million (maximum) 
 
-  HLI projects: 70% of the total cost 
(minimum) 
 
-  Local Labor: 60% of  labor (minimum) 
 
-  Local Materials: 50% of materials used 
(minimum) 
 
-  Number per site  : 1 per ecclesiastical 
constituency 
 
-  Duration of works: ≤ 8 months 
 








ACTIONS/PROJECTS  TYPES OF ELIGIBLE 
PROJECTS  VALUE SCALES 
Investments linked to 
environmental problems 
•  Campaign to protect the 
environment and the vegetation 
cover 
•  Anti-erosion efforts 
•  Reforestation  
-  Requirement: Risk zone from an 
environmental standpoint 
 
-  Cost:≤ Ar 10 million 
 
-  HLI projects: 80% of the total cost 
(minimum) 
 
-  Local Labor: 70% of labor (minimum) 
 
-  Local Materials: 90% of the materials used 
(minimum) 
 
-  Number per site: 3 (maximum) 
 
-  Dimension : modest size not requiring the use 



















































































Is the project to be 
executed included on the 
list of projects financed by 
the CCPREAS? 
(Project identification) 
Is execution of the project 
essential to the community? 
If execution of the project is 
postponed until another period, will 
labor be available? 
Can supplies be procured from 
another location? 
  Budget constraint? 
  Timetable constraint? 
Can the project be executed using 
the HLI system? 
The project is selected 
Will strengthening of technical 
training be possible? 
Is restriction of team members 
possible? 
Are the materials needed for the 
works available on site? 
Will execution of the project 
meet the targeted objectives?  
The project is rejected 
Is labor available at the time of its 
execution?  
  Is this a season of penury? 
  Is there geographic mobility of 
workers during this period?  
  Are there other secondary 
sources of income in the 
community? 
Yes
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To view Social Protection Discussion papers published prior to 2007, please visit 
www.worldbank.org/sp. High labor intensive (HIMO) public works programs have been very popular in
recent years in Madagascar. They have been one of the most common safety net
programs used in Madagascar to address poverty and vulnerability.  The objectives
of these programs are to provide income support to the poor after natural disasters
and during seasonal agricultural employment slack period (soudure), and to
improve much needed local infrastructures. This paper assesses the effectiveness
of HIMO interventions in addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable households
using the data from 15 projects implemented between 2006 and 2008 by several
agencies.  The main finding of this study is that despite their great potential, HIMO
projects have shown the following limitations in the Madagascar context: a) lack
of coordination among projects implemented by different agencies; b) ineffective
targeting and poor selection of projects; c) lack of monitoring and supervision.
The paper identifies four areas for improvement: a) better harmonization and
coordination of HIMO projects to ensure consistency of approaches among
interventions; b) better geographical targeting and selection of projects; c) setting
the wage rate according to the local socio-economic conditions to promote self
selection of the poor; d) better collection of information for monitoring and
evaluation of the impact of projects.
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